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THE CIVIL RIGHTS JUGGERNAUTt
Richard A. Epstein*

It is a great honor and pleasure to give the annual David Baum lecture on
the topic of civil rights. Mr. Baum had an untimely death in 1973, when the set
of issues that defined the civil rights movement was very different from what it
is today. In 1973, the civil rights movement was still coping with the aftereffects
of segregation. It was a period when there was strenuous opposition to the civil
rights laws, and a situation in which their defenders, most notably Senator Hubert
Humphrey, beat many a strategic retreat in order to secure passage of the law. It
was a time at which the decision to include sex as a forbidden category in the
law was met with much skepticism, even derision, and which resulted in the inclusion of a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) Standard for sex, but
not for race.' It was a time when the question of whether or not to integrate Mrs.
Murphy's boarding house raised genuine concern, 2 and the use of disparate impact tests to measure civil rights violations was a highly contested issue. 3

Even the principle of nondiscrimination in public accommodation was resisted at times. But as the cases came down, the civil rights laws were given
expanded purpose. Here are some of the landmark cases, listed in historical order, dealing with major issues such as the consideration of disparate impact, 4 the
role of busing to deal with school integration,5 the identification of protected
classes in disparate treatment cases, 6 the narrow construction of the BFOQ sex
exception, 7 the elimination of sex-based tables for calculating pensions, 8 the role
t This article was originally presented on April 2, 2019, as a lecture in the David C. Baum Memorial
Lectures on Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Series at the University of Illinois College of Law.
The Laurence A Tisch Professor of Law, The New York University School of Law, The Peter and
Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution, and the James Parker Hall Distinguished Professor of
Law Emeritus and Senior Lecturer, The University of Chicago.

1.

42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2

(2018).

2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1) (2018), which exempts owner occupied structures with fewer than five tenants
from the key provisions of the FairHousing Act.
3. Senator Hubert Humphrey sought to defend the passage of the Civil Rights Act by minimizing its
impact, insisting that "the meaning of racial or religious discrimination is perfectly clear.... It means a distinction in treatment given to different individuals because of their race, religion, or national origin." 110 CONG. REC.

5,423 (1964).
4. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (allowing use of disparate impact to establish discrimination).

5.
6.
7.

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).

8. City of L.A. Dep't. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (ignoring sex differences in
calculating pension benefits).
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of affirmative action, 9 the decision to allow state human rights laws to integrate
large social organizations that discriminated on the basis of sex,10 and the adoption of the view, originally championed by Catharine McKinnon in Sexual Harassment of Working Women," that sexual harassment was prohibited by Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act.1 2
Even this short summary makes it clear that the expansions in the 1970s
and early 1980s of the various provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were
done to advance the purpose of ending segregation and promoting integration. I
continue to feel much uneasiness about these decisions, in part because they
move away from the initial "colorblind" standard by creating preferences for
protected classes and allowing affirmative action in their favor.13 But none of
these cases, whatever their merits, had the effect of targeting small and isolated
businesses and individuals for powerful government sanctions. Instead, the earlier string of successes were targeted to make sure that powerful groups did not
themselves engage in various forms of invidious discrimination-here the word
"invidious" is used to allow for affirmative action programs but only in favor of
protected groups. Today, all too many civil rights commissions especially at the
state level function only to pressure small businesses and individuals to conform
to a powerful and overriding vision of the "right" view of the evils of discrimination across the board. The situation marks a powerful change from the landscape that existed at the start of the civil rights movement in 1938, when Justice
Harlan Fiske Stone warned that lax standards of review would not be sufficient
to protect what he termed in CaroleneProductsthe "discrete and insular minorities" of today.1 4 Today those minority groups are in fact the dominant powerbrokers on matters of civil rights, and their influence is all-pervasive, dealing not
only with matters of race and sex discrimination, but also with freedom of speech
and religion for groups that are not members of the dominant coalition.
It is important to understand that the pervasive modern references to "diversity and inclusion" are not renewed calls to heed the lesson of Dr. Martin
Luther King Jr., who proclaimed that what matters is the content of one's character and not the color of one's skin. Nor do such references refer to reaching out
to make sure that individuals from all groups and all walks of life are included in
modern social discourse. Rather, it is evident from the constant insistence that

9. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (allowing an affirmative action exception
to the general colorblind principle, later extended in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)).

10.

Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).

11. CATHARINE M. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION (1979). The key move in her book was to treat harassment not just as an extension of the common law of assault, but as a form of discrimination covered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.

12.
13.

Mentor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
For my general critique, see Richard A. Epstein, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 395-96 (1992).

14. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("Nor need we enquire whether
similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religious or racial minorities, whether
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.") (internal citations omitted).
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diversity and inclusion are compelling state interests that any other concern, including freedom of speech and conscience, must take a subordinate place when
pitted against them, if only so that people whose views do not fit this modern
conception can be shouted down with the justification that their views are so
odious that they do not require refutation. One general theme in this discourse is
a strong distaste for capitalism and an embrace of controversial causes as though
they embody eternal truths. As an example, Vincent Joseph Scully, Jr. was one
of the great figures in art architecture, adored by students and scholars alike. On
his death in 2017, Yale University wrote of him, "Beloved teacher, [w]ho helped
shape a nation."15 But little more than two years later, the Yale Art Department

has seen fit to cancel his course:
Decades old and once taught by famous Yale professors like Vincent
Scully, "Introduction to Art History: Renaissance to the Present" was once
touted to be one of Yale College's quintessential classes. But this change
is the latest response to student uneasiness over an idealized Western
"canon"-a product of an overwhelmingly white, straight, European and
male cadre of artists. 16
And of course, there is always a reason for such historical revision, which
was offered by Tim Barringer, the chairman of Yale's Art Department:
Barringer wrote that the emphasis would be placed on the relationship between European art and other world traditions. The class will also consider
art in relation to "questions of gender, class and 'race"' and discuss its involvement with Western capitalism, Barringer wrote. Its relationship with
climate change will be a "key theme," he wrote.17
This politicization of art is brought about by an art professor who to all
appearances knows next to nothing about the collateral disciplines on which he
treads. The sense of indoctrination is palpable. The level of disrespect for the
western tradition is intense. 18 Barringer does not believe in the power of competition within Yale and would never let the older course be taught by a younger
champion, and offers his own alternative course, which stresses non-Western
themes as well. There is surely room for both. Perhaps he well understands that
his own offering would not survive the market test among the Yale student body.
This creeping orthodoxy is not confined to any single subject matter. As is
evident from the pronouncements of once great institutions like Harvard University and the University of California, that same authoritarian impulse now guarantees that the phrase "diversity and inclusion" is transformed into a commitment
to establish, in both hiring and admissions, systematic preferences in favor of

15. In Memoriam: Vincent Scully, Beloved Teacher 'HelpedShape a Nation', YALE DAILY NEWS (Dec. 1,
2017), https://news.yale.edu/2017/12/01/memoriam-vincent-scully-beloved-teacher-helped-shape-nation [https:
//perma.cc/Y56Q-XJC6].
16. Margaret Hedeman & Matt Kristoffersen, Art History Department to Scrap Survey Course, YALE
DAILY NEWS (Jan. 24, 2020, 12:31 AM), https://yaledailynews.com/biog/2020/01/24/art-history-department-toscrap-survey-course/2/ [https://perma.cc/59D2-WU83].

17. Id.
18. Classes in "Art and Politics," "Global Craft," "The Silk Road" and "Sacred Places" will be offered
instead. Id.
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women and some minority groups, with the deliberate intention of reducing and
marginalizing the position of those who do not share that common vision.l
Thus, forty-seven years after Professor Baum's early death, both the agenda
and the players in the civil rights movement are far different from what they were
in those distant times. I often say to myself, virtually every day, that the news
will contain some disturbing story about how it is that the civil rights movement
has deviated from its original mission. In this lecture I shall talk about some of
the cases that I think should give pause to the way in which we think about civil
rights. In doing so, it is also important to recognize that in the last thirty or so
years, civil rights claims have come into tension with the ability of individuals
to act on their sincere religious beliefs in the conduct of their business, where
they are now subject to the same strong claims of "diversity and inclusion." In
dealing with this full range of issues, there is no question, that as one who came
of age in the 1950s and 1960s, the ugliness in race relations and various forms
of religious intolerance that plagued those times have largely vanished from the
scene. So, in vanquishing institutionalized segregation, the country has advanced
enormously from a once routine and deplorable state of affairs.
Yet all too often it is said that this advance is only superficial, because we
have yet to deal with ingrained habits of mind that replicate the worst features of
segregation. Thus in her book, The New Jim Crow, a most evocative title,
Michelle Alexander opens with the trope that on race relations, "the more things
change, the more they remain the same." 20 That conceit is said to stem from the
fact that black prisoners lose their right to vote after incarceration, albeit on a
race neutral basis on the same terms and conditions as white prisoners. One could
argue both ways on the question of whether felons should lose their voting rights,
either during incarceration or for some period of time thereafter. But no matter
what decision is made on that set of questions, the evidence does not support any
conclusion that Jim Crow is alive and well, either explicitly or in some craftily
disguised form. There is no showing that the disparate impact of the sanctions
arises from any differential enforcement of the criminal law, but instead arises
from differential rates of criminal behavior, which is of course a topic that deserves further intensive study. There is nowhere any institutionalized activity,
overt or covert, that pushes in that direction. But nonetheless it is a convenient
fiction to keep alive in order to justify policies that are themselves often racially
discriminatory as an ostensible defensive reaction against some supposedly
greater peril. 2 1
Harsh condemnations like Alexander's also do a massive disservice to the
many individuals of all races who have done much to improve the racial climate
19.

See infra text accompanying notes 75, 79.

20.

MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS

1 (rev. ed. 2011).
21. For a forceful denial of the conventional wisdom of systematic racial bias, see Heather McDonald, The
Myth of Systemic Police Racism, WALL ST. J. (June 2, 2020, 1:44 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-mythof-systemic-police-racism-11591119883 ("A solid body of evidence finds no structural bias in the criminal-justice system with regard to arrests, prosecution or sentencing. Crime and suspect behavior, not race, determine
most police actions.").
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in the United States. We live in an age of full-throated affirmative action, which
has now morphed into programs of diversity and inclusion that no longer embrace any ideal of sex- or color-blindness. It is a favorable sign of how much
things have changed for the better that today, many police departments are
headed by African-American officers and offer extensive programming with an
eye to improve race relations. The list of changes in the formal and informal
culture of the United States since the days of my youth in the 1950s are mindboggling, and it badly distorts the historical record to think that the current state
of race relations in particular, and civil rights in general, is down deep somehow
unchanged from the past. Lest anyone have any doubts about that conclusion, I
suggest that they look at any part of the enormous literature that documents the
explicit and often brutal forms of segregation and racism that are thankfully
largely a thing of the past. I am thinking here of such books such as W. J. Cash,
The Mind of the South (1941), C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career ofJim
Crow (1955), and Isabel Wilkerson, Warmth of Other Suns: The Epic Story of
America's GreatMigration (2010). No one should ever, ever forget or minimize
the evil of organized racial repression and segregation in the South.
But this is a new era, and the stark contrast between what happens today
and what happened then is most troublesome. It is impossible to deal with all the
highways and byways associated with the study of race and gender in the United
States. It is not possible to critique all the endless variations of appeals to issues
of diversity and inclusion, and in this essay, I shall consciously stay away from
the highly contentious issues associated with police enforcement of the full range
of criminal sanctions. But even within the area of private law, the mood has
changed, so that there are too often these tidal waves of indignation and resentment that do not admit of any dissent or disagreement, and now pose their own
authoritarian risks, which is why I write, with much unhappiness, of the New
Civil Rights Juggernaut: it is either that you are with us on diversity and inclusion, or you are the target of unrelenting pressure, both from within your home
institution and from without. It is no longer permissible to let people with deeply
held differences on matters of religion or politics to go their separate ways. It is
instead necessary, with some mixture of criticism, abuse, coercion and litigation,
to make everyone heel to the modern diktats of appropriate behavior on all matters of race, sex, and religion, even though this modem view has its own pathologies and excesses that stem largely from its refusal to recognize the autonomous
choices of others. The root of the term "totalitarianism" stems from those first
two syllables "total," which is intended to mean the state exercise of power, in
both the hard form-coercion-and the soft form-grants and influence-to
control a complex set of national relationships. Hannah Arendt wrote a classic
book showing how totalitarianism played out in one era.22 I fear that it is becoming more necessary to talk about the totalitarian instincts of our own age, which
is too often characterized by the position that every purported social consensus
deserves unanimous support, thereby leaving no room for dissenters.

22.

HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (1951).
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In order to set the stage, I think that it is incumbent upon me to explain
where I sit on the political spectrum. The point is one that raises some serious
difficulties because I am generally called a libertarian, which is accurate as far
as it goes. Unfortunately, it does not go far enough. There is a deep division
between two branches of libertarian thought that need to be recognized. The first
of these is the hard-line libertarian position, which claims that the only proper
use of the state is to control force and fraud. Under that position, all forms of
discrimination against other individuals in all settings are possible, without recrimination. But the second position, that of classical liberalism, which far more
accurately reflects my views, recognizes that there are legitimate state functions
that go beyond operating as what is commonly called the "night-watchman
state." 23 Those functions include the use of state power to provide public goods,
whether through taxation or eminent domain, and, most critically for these purposes, to control the exercise of monopoly power. In general, this position recognizes the need for state coercion to address so-called collective-action problems, where high transaction costs can block the adoption of some solution that
is preferred by all parties, but not achievable through voluntary means. The normative limitation imposed on this application of state power, whether manifested
as taxation, regulation, or eminent domain, is that this power should only be used
to achieve Pareto improvements-situations where at least one person is better
off and no one is worse off. The ostensible radical individualism, or even worse
"possessive individualism," 24 which holds that anyone can do what they want no
matter what the consequences to others, so often the popular caricature of libertarianism, is effectively cabined by the classical liberal approach because it only
permits individuals to pursue strategies that allow prices, terms, and conditions
to be set according to the competitive market.
The adoption of this position relies heavily on the work of Ronald Coase in
his 1960 article The Problem of Social Cost,2 5 which considers transaction costs
in the organization of social institutions. It also draws on the 1965 work of Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action,26 which shows how this approach applies to the provision of collective goods, whether through taxation or regulation.
Indeed, this approach, which I developed at length in my 1995 book, Simple
Rules for a Complex World,27 shapes the way in which I think about the application of the civil rights law, for it requires that one draw the distinction between
common carriers, to which duties of nondiscrimination do apply, and competitive
markets, to which they do not. It is important, therefore, not to conflate those
positions, which was done, for example, by Professor Cass Sunstein in his review
of my book The ClassicalLiberal Constitution, which he grandly entitled "The
Man Who Made Libertarians Wrong About the Constitution:How Richard Ep-

stein's Highly Influential, Highly PoliticizedScholarship Cemented Tea Party
23.
24.
25.

Marian Sawer, Gender, Metaphorand the State, FEMINIST REV. Spring 1996, at 119.
C.B. Macpherson, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE (1962).
R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. ECON. 1 (1960).

26.

MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF

GROUPS (1965).
27.

RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,

SIMPLE RULES FOR A

COMPLEX wORLD (1995).
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Dogma."28 One of his punchlines in the review was "[e]veryone knows who
Rand Paul's father is, but in an intellectual sense it is Richard Epstein who is his
daddy." 29
No way. Indeed, this is a situation in which I am proud to disclaim paternity, for while there is surely some overlap between my substantive positions and
those of Rand Paul, our methodological approaches are quite different. He tends
to be an intuitive libertarian, and I tend to be one who is explicit about the consequentialist foundations of my position. 30 I regard Paul's form of libertarian
thought as antithetical to my own on many key questions, including all those
which involve common carriers. 3 1 The same is true with respect to the Tea Party,
with which I have never had any informal communications or formal associations, and with whom I have never had any philosophical affinity. My positions
have long antedated these transient political movements. But the positions of the
libertarian and the classical liberal do converge on one critical point, which is the
inadvisability of intervening in the outcomes of voluntary exchanges, including
those which occur in competitive markets. In these settings, the only coordination problems are those which arise when competitors try to collude. Otherwise
in competitive markets, there is no independent need for state provision of public
goods.
The focal point of this difference arises in those cases of common carriers
and public utilities, where the monopoly position of the service provider typically
provides a duty to serve the public on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory
terms. The rules that determined how this principle works were some of the most
litigated questions of the late nineteenth century, but the purpose of the enterprise
was always to figure out how to make firms charge only those rates which approximated, on a risk-adjusted basis, the rates of return that they could earn in
competitive markets. It is no accident that the period of greatest social advancement in the United States corresponds to the so-called Lochner era, named after
Lochner v. New York,32 which covered, roughly speaking, the years between
1870-1940.33
Yet, it is a sign of how much these principles were violated at the height of
Jim Crow that the one group which was in large measure excluded from these
improvements were African Americans. And the reason was that in this case the
classical liberal principles that limited the scope of government police power
were systematically disregarded. Racial segregation, then pervasive throughout

28. Cass R. Sunstein, The Man Who Made Libertarians Wrong About the Constitution, NEW REPUBLIC
(May 18, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/117619/classical-liberal-constitution-richard-epstein-reviewed
[https://perma.cc/4SYD-U48E].
29. Id.
30. Richard A. Epstein, The UtilitarianFoundationsof NaturalLaw, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 711
(1989).
31. Richard A. Epstein, My RandPaulProblem,HOOVER INST. (Feb. 3, 2014), https://www.hoover.org/research/my-rand-paul-problem [https://perma.cc/78T6-VUMX].
32. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
33.

See ROBERT J. GORDON, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN GROWTH: THE U.S. STANDARD OF LIVING

SINCE THE CIVo. WAR 25-29 (2016).
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Washington D.C., was reinstituted in the federal government by Woodrow Wilson, shortly after he took office in 1913.34 The decision provoked no legal challenge because it was widely thought to fall within the ambit of the police power,
even though it did not embody concerns with health, safety, morals, or the general welfare. That unwillingness to take on the Wilson administration rested in
large measure on the 1896 decision of Plessy v. Ferguson,35 which among its
many sins, improperly barred the use of a nondiscrimination principle by forcing
the segregation of white and black customers on trains, which were then quintessential common carriers. Overturning Plessy on this point (as well as on segre36
gated schools and anti-miscegenation laws) in Brown v. Board of Education
was long overdue. But by the same token, it is important not to overshoot the
mark when correcting against the evils of the Jim Crow era. The willingness on
the part of the modern civil rights advocates to force common carrier status and
hence nondiscrimination obligations on competitive suppliers is the source of
much of the mischief and power of the Civil Rights Juggernaut.
Turning now from the past to the present, let me talk about some recentrecent as of January 1, 2020-cases and events that should give us all pause.
Much has happened since that time, but the issues that I address here are still
relevant insofar as they reflect widespread attitudes in the United States on critical issues, each representing a step backwards in the struggle to deal with equality on matters of race and sex in the United States. The first question that I shall
refer to is the simple issue of whether any person is required to engage in commercial activities that are inconsistent with their sincerely held religious beliefs.
I think that the answer to this question is that such compulsion should be regarded
as both unacceptable and unconstitutional in any free society, even though there
are powerful forces that believe that majoritarian sentiments should be forced on
the population as a whole. 37
The second question that I shall deal with involves the use of defamation
actions against those who wrongly accuse others of racial or sexual biases of any
sort. Ideally, there should be no need for such actions, but on some occasions
today the action for defamation is needed to protect against various forms of
discrimination, a sharp change from earlier days when defamation actions were
used to prop up segregation, not to bring it down.
The third issue deals with questions of alleged sex discrimination by companies like Google in their hiring of technical personnel so central to the core of
its business. In 2017, the company fired one of its programmers, James Damore,
for offering the argument that accurate statistical generalizations are essential for
making informed decisions under conditions of uncertainty, replacing the idea
with a norm that condemns all such generalizations as illicit forms of stereotypes,
34. For a sharp condemnation ofWilson, see Dick Lehr, The Racist Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, ATLANTIC
(Nov. 27, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/1l/wilson-legacy-racism/417549/ [https://

perma.cc/WTK4-5DZK].
35. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
36. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
37. See, e.g., Melissa Murray, Consequential Sex: #MeToo, Masterpiece Cakeshop, and Private Sexual
Regulation, 113 Nw. U. L. REv. 825 (2018).
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which again subordinates questions of truth and falsity to the current Civil Rights
Juggernaut.

The fourth and final issue involves the imposition of various required statements that applicants must sign to indicate the ways in which their actions will,
regardless of their field of study, advance the cause of diversity and inclusion.
These forced statements are all too reminiscent of the loyalty oaths against communism that were required in the 1950s and should be greeted with the same
kind of constitutional and social hostility. A free society does not make political
commitments a sine qua non for university (or industry) jobs, and the willingness
to impose them represents a sad form of modern totalitarianism.
THE ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

Days before this lecture was given, on March 25, 2019, the Yale Law
School, from which I graduated in 1968, announced a policy that appeared to
withdraw financial support from students who worked for Christian law firms. 38
The initial impulse for this decision was the strong protest from the student group
OutLaws, the school's LGBTQ affinity group, which had denounced the Alliance Defending Freedom (ADF), whose attorney Kristen Waggoner had successfully defended Jack Phillips, the sole proprietor of the Masterpiece Cakeshop in
the Supreme Court decision Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission.39 The level of disquiet did not end there, as there were concerted
efforts by similar groups to insist that any organization that espoused various
forms of conservative thought lay beyond the pale. The effort was, and still is, to
insist that certain positions are so wrong that they should be excluded from respectable debate without the need for any further explanation.
The public attacks on Philips and Waggoner are symptomatic of the Civil
Rights Juggernaut, whereby activists groups, who are so convinced of the inevitable soundness of their substantive views, are prepared to steamroll, by the use
of public and private force, all those that disagree with them, no matter the sincerity of those dissenting convictions. Such dissenting individuals have no zone
of protected activity, either in business or any other area of public life, in which
they can stay true to their own beliefs. Those individuals who claim the right to
be left alone are now treated as the illegitimate heirs of segregationists and bigots
of the earlier civil rights age. In making these strong claims, the new generation
of civil rights advocates ignore the fundamental difference between the forced
segregation imposed by government and backed by private force, and the freedom due to everyone to express one's views and to act on one's religious convictions so long as you do not engage in the use or threat of force against others.
ADF respected that distinction in its defense of Jack Phillips. Its detractors and
critics did not.

38.

Aaron

Haviland,

Yale Law School Yanks Stipends from Students Who Work for Christian Firms,

FEDERALIST (Apr. 1, 2019), https://thefederalist.com/2019/04/01/yale-law-school-yanks-stipends-students-work

-christian-firms/ [https://perma.cc/QG8K-M379].
39. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018); Haviland, supra note 38.
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This new juggernaut needs to be strongly resisted. ADF (with whom I have
collaborated on some of these cases) is known for its conservative stand on a
wide range of issues, including same-sex marriage, abortion, gender identity, and
of course religious freedom. I do not agree with all the positions of that group,
or indeed any other, but it seems odd and dangerous in the extreme for the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) to have denounced this organization as a "hate
group," simply because it strongly disagrees with its substantive positions. Ms.
Waggoner wrote a powerful op-ed in the Wall Street Journal on April 3, 2019,
in which she took the SPLC to task for its abusive practices, and noted, sorrowfully, that one of its cofounders, its president, and its legal director have all departed under a cloud of scandal about their own forms of unspecified workplace
misconduct. 40 Calling someone a hate group, as did the SPLC, is a per se form
of defamation that should never be attached to any group that is in good standing
before the bar, won the particular case, and has enjoyed success in arguing major
cases before the Supreme Court. This condemnation speaks ill of the condemner,
not the condemned.
Indeed, the SPLC's characterization of the ADF is especially odd given that
Justice Kennedy, writing the majority opinion for a bitterly divided court in Masterpiece Cakeshop, refused to announce any clear principles to determine when
a religious person, on grounds of conscience, is allowed to refuse service to a
gay couple who requests that they bake a cake celebrating their same-sex marriage. Kennedy's narrow grounds for the decision was that the Colorado Civil
Rights Commission had acted with evident malice against Philips, which meant
41
that its current set of sanctions could not stand.
Masterpiece offered no clear instructions on how that dispute should be
handled on remand, but the outcome makes all too clear that the Colorado Civil
Rights Commission betrayed its role through its own abusive conduct toward
Philips; conduct that did not meet the minimum standards of professional decency. That point was highlighted by its injudicious remark that claims of religious liberty are all too often a cloak for such events as the Holocaust. 42 Sadly,
that animus, often concealed, is one of the reasons why these cases continue,
43
including the recent decision in 303 CreativeLLC v. Elenis, which raised similar issues as those in Masterpiece, with the main issue in 303 Creativebeing the
validity of a Colorado statute that makes it illegal to publish any electronic or
printed communication that indicates that a business's full and equal provision
of services will be denied on the grounds of sexual orientation, while providing

40. Kristin Waggoner, We Were Smeared by the SPLC, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.wsj.
com/articles/we-were-smeared-by-the-splc-11554332764 [https://perma.cc/3H7W-EACY]. Those consequences
include harassment and physical assaults, and property damage deliberately caused by those who share SPLC's

beliefs.
41.

Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724 (2018).

42. "Freedom of religion and religion has been used to justify all kinds of discrimination throughout history, whether it be slavery, whether it be the holocaust, whether it be-I mean, we-we can list hundreds of
situations where freedom of religion has been used to justify discrimination. And to me it is one of the most
despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use to-to use their religion to hurt others." Id at 1729.

43.

303 Creative L.L.C. v. Elenis, 405 F. Supp. 3d 907 (D. Colo. 2019).
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no exception for narrow notices stating the refusal to provide services for samesex weddings.44
The issues in 303 Creative are parallel to those in Masterpiece. Indeed, I
coauthored a brief on behalf of Masterpiece in its case, and have signed on to a
similar one in 303 Creative. In both cases, it is always a mistake to use state
coercion in a competitive market to violate the religious beliefs of others, given
the wide range of choices that are open to those people who are denied service
by any individual firm.4 5 My own position, which I have consistently defended
for thirty years, 4 6 is that wholly apart from any special religious claim, the antidiscrimination laws are both misguided and unconstitutional when other business
or occupational choices are available. That issue is not presented in these cases,
as the business owners' consistent behavior demonstrates that they neither seek
nor want a blanket exception to providing any services to a class of persons. Both
Masterpiece and 303 Creativeprovide services to gay couples, with very narrow
exceptions for specialty works involving same-sex weddings.
Nonetheless, as a matter of principle, it is critical to address the broader
claim that there is no need to carve out any special exceptions for religious liberty, which to many people always raises the whiff of an Establishment Clause
violation. 47 No one firm constitutes the market, and the proper question is not
whether every person can gain service from every provider, but whether some
provider or group of providers will come forward to service those individuals
whom any given proprietor may turn down. The huge number of firms in all
states that specialize in handling same-sex weddings is ample testimony to the
power of that position. These firms emerge in all states, whether or not they have
any prohibition against discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, which
proves that even without any antidiscrimination law there are ample resources
available to satisfy demands from a large, informed, and active market segment.
This is but one manifestation of the bedrock proposition that an active market
will leave no significant element of demand untouched. Indeed, I am not aware
of even a single instance anywhere in which a same-sex couple has been unable
to obtain their needed services from the extensive list of firms anxious for their
business.
The clear implication of this position is that in the absence of any kind of
market failure, there is no need whatsoever for government intervention in order
to make sure that every firm serves every segment of the market. What matters

is the number of choices available to consumers, and if that number is large, the
number of unavailable choices is of no social consequence at all. This argument
for market sorting is even stronger when the particular vendor has strong religious beliefs that back up his or her decision, and is willing-as is the case in all
these disputes-consistent with both their own religious convictions and the civil
44.

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (2014).

45.

Brief of Amici Curiae Law and Economics Scholars in Support of Petitioners at 22-23, Masterpiece

Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138
46.
47.

S. Ct.

1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 4118065.

Epstein, supra note 13.
For my early defense of this position, see Richard A. Epstein, Religious Liberty in the Welfare State,

31 wM. & MARY L. REv. 375,388-96 (1990).
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rights laws to provide a wide array of services to gay and lesbian individuals.
Perhaps groups like Yale's OutLaws are correct in their substantive views, but if
they are, then they should be prepared to debate their opponents in public and
not resort to denunciation or strongarm tactics in order to force its rivals off the
field. They will have a hard time persuading a neutral observer that they should
be allowed to maintain their dominant position by continuing to censor all dissenters.

There is yet another way to look at this situation, which is to consider the
old standard for equitable jurisdiction over the balance of hardships. In Masterpiece, the gay couple, Charlie Craig and David Mullins, sought to obtain a wedding cake from Jack Phillips. They were turned down, receiving from Phillips
suggestions as to where else they could purchase the cake. In fact, they found
nearby another vendor who met their needs, a vendor they selected from one of
the many bakers that served gay couples.4 8 But what happened to Jack Phillips?
Craig and Mullins referred the case to the Colorado Civil Rights Commission,
which continued with its investigation of the case even though Craig and Mullins
were no longer a part of it, having obtained their needed services elsewhere.
Their actual costs of walking down the block were close to zero. So then why
make a huge production by turning over the case to a result-oriented body stacked
with advocates from one side only? Such Commissions are to this day the worst
type of tribunals to deal with these issues, given that they are specialized bodies
already pre-committed to a given point of view. The evident bias of the specific
panel in question should give rise to serious due process concerns. At this point,
Philips was subjected to heavy legal expenses, emotional trauma and public
abuse, including threats of violence. The notion that everyone has to knuckle
under to a given social conception of "good" is a dangerous form of state monopoly control where none is needed. Indeed, whenever there is a social consensus that certain groups should receive particular kinds of services, there is all the
more reason not to force the lone dissenters into the dominant mold.
In response, it is often asked what should be done if the baker in fact possessed some form of monopoly power. That suggestion is a nonstarter with
99.99% of the population, and in general it is always dangerous business to make
social policy that starts with the extreme outlier only to apply it awkwardly to
conventional cases. The apparent logic for this result is the correct major premise
that when the duties of a common carrier attach, all customers are then entitled
to service at fair and reasonable rates. It is of course possible to imagine cases in
which there is only one baker for the entire northern territory of Alaska in some
isolated community. But those outlandish cases are a dot on the larger landscape.
And even in these cases, the wayward baker is not a common carrier. A common
carrier is supposed to provide only standardized services-power, electricity, or
a seat on a train-cakes that are individual creations do not fall into that group.
48. See also Elizabeth Kiefer, This Married Couple Just Won A Major Victory for LGBT Rights,
REFINERY29 (Aug. 14,2015, 12:30 PM), https://www.refinery29.com/en-us/2015/08/92392/colorado-gbt-rights
-victory-masterpiece-cakeshop [https://perma.cc/L2SV-5ZSJ] ("After their story spread across the Internet, the
couple was inundated with cake offers-'even from China,' Craig noted.").
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Indeed, if someone did not have any baker nearby, it is always possible to bake
the cake for one's self, rely on a friend or neighbor, or ship it in from a remote
location. It stretches the notion of common carrier beyond recognition by thinking that it has the remotest application to the confines of Lakewood, Colorado,
the situs of Masterpiece Cakeshop.
Clearly, the traditional sources of obligation do not even begin to deal with
Jack Phillips, or virtually any of the multitude of the cases of this sort. It is therefore extremely important to be careful about the use of state force in those settings where such intense feelings are at stake. Recall that in all these cases the
antidiscrimination laws do not impose-nor should they impose-a universal
obligation of service on all persons at all times. It is therefore pertinent to note
that all of the statutes dealing with sexual orientation do not impose any obligation on gay parties to serve evangelical Christians at their cakeshops, even though
the opposite obligation incumbent on evangelicals remains in full force. In these
cases, the standard common law rule applies so that parties denied service are
left to their own resources no matter how offended or inconvenienced they may
be made by the denial of service. Their want of any religious commitment is
utterly beside the point. It should therefore be a point of real concern to have
selective interventions under the civil rights laws, where the evangelicals have
to serve the gay rights activists but not the other way around. The overall situation should be one where the basic common law rules trump the misguided extension of the antidiscrimination laws.
The decision in Masterpiece illustrates a rising tension that dates back to
the misguided decision of Justice Antonin Scalia in Employment Division of Or-

egon v. Smith,49 where he held, in a way that set the stage for Masterpiece
Cakeshop, that the touchstone for dealing with religious liberty cases was the
neutrality principle, whereby members of a religious group could not be subject
to punishments that were not imposed upon their nonreligious counterparts. That
principle is surely part of any sound approach to religious liberties, but it is hardly
sufficient unto the day, for there are many cases in which the equal application
of the same rule will have far heavier impacts on the members of religious
groups. The simple example is a requirement that all persons in military service
be required to eat pork products as part of their daily rations, even if they have
religious objections to the practice. The well-established practice prior to Smith
was to allow for accommodations for religious liberties so long as the collateral
burdens of that accommodation were restricted. That test would surely require
that adjustments in diet be made for soldiers, except perhaps in cases of abject
emergency. But it would not require the government to respect the wishes of a
religious person that wanted to light candles in a trench at night that could be
used to guide enemy fire.

49.

494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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To reach his dubious conclusion, Justice Scalia had to dispatch two earlier
51
decisions, Sherbert v. Verner5 0 and Wisconsin v. Yoder, both of which demonstrated the Supreme Court's willingness to accept such accommodations. He did
so on the grounds that those cases involved some amalgam of religious and
speech liberties, even though the spirit of accommodation should reach each liberty separately. Yoder allowed the Amish the freedom to take their children out
of public schools notwithstanding the state interest in the education of all young.
Sherbert held that a Seventh-day Adventist was entitled to an accommodation
under South Carolina's employment law because of the faith's religious prohibition against work on the Sabbath. Both of these decisions involved weighty interests on both sides, which sadly was not the case in Smith. It was therefore no
surprise that even as of 1990, Smith proved unwholesome to both religious offenders and civil libertarians, necessitating the introduction of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 52 which sought to restore, imperfectly, the earlier balance by explicitly treating Sherbert and Yoder as the benchmarks against which
these issues should be measured. But a generation later, the consensus about the
law was shattered when the American Civil Liberties Union announced in 2015
that it could no longer support the statute because, in its view, the law had become "a sword to discriminate against women, gay and transgender people and
others."53 Yet not a syllable was said about the interests on the other side, which
again marks the lapse into totalitarian instincts that bore full fruit with the treatment of Jack Phillips's Masterpiece Cakeshop by the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission.
The immediate source of the ACLU's wrath was the deeply divided Su54
preme Court decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores. The bottom line in the
case was that the conservative majority of the Supreme Court resisted the demands that a universal guarantee of contraceptive coverage be imposed on employers whose genuine religious beliefs refused to accept such imposition. Quite
simply, the argument was that the state has many ways to supply the coverage

out of general revenues without forcing reluctant parties to provide healthcare
they found objectionable as a matter of personal faith. The tragedy in a case like
Hobby Lobby is the utter want of any accommodation and the willingness to treat
principled religious decisions as naked acts of retribution. The ingenious nature
of these cases was illustrated by the extent to which the Obama Administration
was prepared to go in dealing with the contraceptive mandate under the Afford55
able Care Act, where in Zubik v. Burwel, it was prepared to allow religious
institutions to escape the mandate only if they authorized the government to bring
50.
51.

374 U.S. 398 (1963).
406 U.S. 205 (1972).

52.

Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified as

amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb).
53.

Louise Melling, ACLU: Why We Can No Longer Support the Federal 'Religious Freedom' Law,

WASH. POST (June 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/congress-should-amend-the-abused-re-

ligious-freedom-restoration-act2015/06/25/ee6aaa
perma.cc/XRJ4-CBFX].
54. 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
55. 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam).
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suit against their insurers who in turn would be prevented from raising insurance
premiums against the religious groups. But under standard religious principles,
the authorization of an immoral act is a but-for cause of complicity. Sadly, the
government did not appear to recognize that the simple solution in these cases
was to provide for the necessary care out of the government's general revenues.
It is only the desire to hurt religious institutions, not to benefit women in search
of contraceptive devices, that explains the government's position. Masterpiece
Cake is only the latest, but not the last, of the authoritarian threats to religious
liberties.
OBERLIN COLLEGE AND DEFAMATION

The incident at Yale with which I opened this Article took place nearly two
years ago, but unfortunately, the Civil Rights Juggernaut continues to push hard
to drive its opponents from the public debate. Shortly after I gave this lecture, an
incident at Oberlin College showed how fragile the principles of civic peace can
be. Gibson's Bakery is a long-time local establishment near the Oberlin College
campus, which had for over one hundred years enjoyed a close working relationship with the College, its faculty and its students. But on the evening of November 9, 2016, one day after Donald Trump won the 2016 presidential election, a
black student attempted to steal a bottle of wine from Gibson's. When the owner,
Allyn Gibson, sought to restrain the thief, he was left flat on his back, having
been attacked by the thief and his two female companions. 56 No one denies that
the incident took place just as I have described it, as all three of the offending
parties signed statements to that effect.
Yet the huge racial turmoil and demonstrations that followed treated Gibson's as though it were at fault, and condemned Gibson's in no uncertain terms
as a "RACIST establishment with a LONG ACCOUNT of RACIAL
PROFILING and DISCRIMINATION." 57 Oberlin's Vice President for Communications, Ben Jones, chimed in: "F-em ... they've made their own bed
now." 58 Oberlin students posted these claims of racial profiling on campus buildings, together with a resolution urging Oberlin President Marvin Krislov (who
has since resigned) and Dean Meredith Raimondo to "condemn by written prom-

ulgation the treatment of students of color by Gibson's Food Market and Bakery." 59 Everyone concedes that racist practices deserve strong condemnation. It
is for just that reason that false charges of racism, which are intended to deflect
attention from the wrongful conduct of one's friends, are so odious.
56. OBERL[N POLICE REPORT, INCIDENT 16-00621, https://legalinsurrection.com/wp-content/uploads/
2016/1l/Oberlin-Police-Dept-Incident-Report-Gibsons-Bakery.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YWS-KB4B].
57. Isaac Stanley-Becker, Protests at Oberlin Labeled a Bakery Racist. Now, the College Has Been Ordered to Pay $11 Million forLibel, WASH. POST (June 10, 2019, 5:58 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/na-

tion/2019/06/10/oberlin-college-gibsons-bakery-libel-million-racist/ [https://perma.cc/X9TV-W5N7].
58. Michelle Malkin, Oberlin's Racial Hucksterism Comes Home to Roost, CREATORS SYNDICATE (June
19, 2019), https://www.creators.com/read/michelle-malkin/06/19/oberlins-racial-hucksterism-comes-home-toroost [https://perma.cc/Q9K9-SG5U].
59. Abraham Socher, O Oberlin, My Oberlin, ComMENT. MAG. (Sept. 2019), https://www.commentary
magazine.com/articles/abraham-socher/o-oberlin-my-oberlin/ [https://perma.cc/2TZZ-4RDY].
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As the charges remained unabated, Gibson and Gibson's family resorted to
60
a defamation action to recover their loss of trade and custom. The lawsuit itself
marks a deep irony in the transformation of race relationships from an earlier
generation, in which a segregationist government used defamation actions to
maintain its own power. By far the most famous defamation lawsuit of the twentieth century is New York Times v. Sullivan,61 which arose out of a famous advertisement published in the New York Times, entitled "Heed their Rising
Voices," which outlined a set of government abuses practiced by Montgomery
County, Alabama in response to the civil rights protests of the day. The advertisement documented the violent responses to civil rights protests throughout the
south, including Orangeburg, South Carolina, Montgomery County, and elsewhere. L. B. Sullivan, who was an elected Commissioner of Montgomery
County, brought suit against the New York Times on the grounds that the advertisement contained certain error of facts on minor points-the police did not ring
the campus, they were located nearby-and so on. Even though Sullivan was not
mentioned by name in the advertisement, he was awarded $500,000 (in 1960
dollars) for defamation, without the showing of any actual injury. The Alabama
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in an opinion that inspired no confidence. 62 The United States Supreme Court could not intervene on state court
grounds, but it could invoke the First Amendment to set limits on the ability to
convert innocent speech into defamation, which is exactly what it did. The Court
was surely right in overturning the Alabama judgment, even if the grounds on
which the decision rested were not ideal. 63 The risk of ruination through litigation was far too great.
But note the obvious difference in the mission in the two generations of
defamation cases. The 1964 suit was designed to make sure that the entrenched
powers heard the voices of others. The pattern of behavior of the students at
Oberlin College was designed to suppress and intimidate. The jury responded
with a huge verdict in favor of Gibson's of some $44 million, which had to be
pared back to comply with statutory limitations.64 But the entire episode shows
just how profoundly the balance of power has shifted in these cases, as even some
65
sober voices in the Oberlin Community recognized. The power lies with activist groups on college campuses that do not reflect more general social attitudes.

60.

Stanley-Becker, supra note 57.

61.
62.

376 U.S. 254 (1964).
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25 (Ala. 1962).

63.

For my views, see Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHi. L. REv.

782 (1986).
64. Assoc. Press, Judge Slashes Gibson's Bakery $44 Million Settlement, CLEVELAND.COM (June 28,
https://www.cleveland.com/news/2019/06/judge-slashes-gibsons-bakery-44-million-settlement.html
2019),
[https://perma.cc/RSP2-S8AX].
65. David Marwil, College's Appeal in Gibson's Case Misguided, Avoidable, OBERLIN REv. (Nov. 8,
[https://
2019), https://oberlinreview.org/19829/opinions/colleges-appeal-in-gibsons-case-misguided-avoidable/
perma.cc/VH79-4L3Z]. I urge the College to refrain from appealing the Gibson's case. Instead, Oberlin must
turn inward and reflect on what led to this unfortunate state of affairs in the first place. The behavior of the
College, by which I mean students and administrators alike, revolves around the false premise that Gibson's was
a racist institution. The College's actions towards Gibson's were arrogant and mean-spirited throughout.
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Yet the common trope today is to assume that groups that have dominance in
practice are oppressed in theory so that their actions can always be justified in
the name of fighting against powerful, if hidden, forms of institutional racism. It
is high time that no group should be able to feign weakness in order to gain favor,
either through the press or the courts. The civil rights laws do not exempt any
group from the basic norms of civility.

GOOGLE AND STEREOTYPES
One constant theme of the modern civil rights movement is that we should
be aware of the dangers of stereotypes, a word that has an unfailingly negative
connotation in the modern literature on discrimination. A charge of stereotyping
can be too easily used to condemn anyone who wants to use an accurate statistical
generalization about differences between groups, differences which can be derived from the accumulated differences in individual traits. There is little doubt
that there is some degree of natural variation in traits among individuals within
any given group, and hence, it must be possible for there to be differences in the
distribution of these traits across groups. The larger question is how to draw inferences from individual differences to differences between groups.
The simplest way in which to do this is to array all members of the group
from top to bottom, say by height. To make the example easier, without affecting
the soundness of the analysis, assume that there are two groups with the same
number of individuals. Now arrange each group by declining height and then
compare. The group differences are accurate if there is a one-to-one correspondence such that the n-th person in the first group is always taller (or shorter) than
the n-th person in the other. It then becomes correct to say that members of the
first group are, as a rule, taller than those in the second group. Note that this
cautious statement is consistent with the observation that some individuals in the
second group are taller than those in the first group. Note too it is possible to
further refine any inquiry into group differences so that it does not only look to
rank order, but also seeks to estimate the magnitude of the shifts-to make in
other words, not only ordinal, but also cardinal comparisons. Thus it is also possible to attach numbers for the height of each person, which then makes it possible to make statements of means and variances, which then gives some accurate
measure of the size of those differences.
By using this method, it is possible to construct distributions with means
and variances for both groups in order to show the relationship between the
groups. Both the mean and the variance matter. What cannot be done is to infer
from any standard distribution that all members of the first group are taller than
those of the second. To make that mistake is to assume that the variance between
the groups is zero. To be sure, if there is only one bit of information available,
say membership in first compared to the second group, then the rational decision
maker looking for a taller person will always choose someone in the first group,
but in so doing will consciously make huge numbers of mistakes that can be
avoided by having more information about the complete distributional patterns
of both groups.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

1558

[Vol. 2020

Once that information is provided, it is possible to predict the decisions as
to what persons will be selected from each group. At this point, it is useful to
note that the two distributions create a kind of tournament,6 and it is instructive
to see how a market that cares only about the relevant trade-offs between candidates work when successive rounds of promotions are made, so that the winners
of the first tournament advance into the second round and so on. The result will
always be that if the first group has a higher mean and a greater variance, it will
have, no matter where the cut-off point is set, a higher fraction of individuals in
the second group than it did in the first, and that this winnowing process will
continue, until the bitter end where only members from the final group are chosen. This approach applies to all sorts of cognitive or physical skills, in all walks
of life, including athletics and academics. 67 These performance standards are obviously more complex than a simple height measure, but in order to make any
decision they must all be combined into a single index, which in turn requires
some weight be attached to each relevant variable. There is nothing about a statistical analysis that weds the decision makers in the second round to follow the
numbers alone. They can make whatever adjustments they want. But what they
cannot do is to alter the results of the data and hold constant the quality of the
pool over time. That trade-off cannot be escaped. It is a social decision, not a
technical one, of whether to make these adjustments, and if so, to what degree.
This kind of statistical discussion is fraught with social anxieties whenever
matters turn to race or sex, but it becomes a dangerous state of affairs when true
information is dismissed because the message is unpalatable to the dominant social groups. In this regard, it is illustrative to mention the response at Google by

its employees when one of its mid-level employees, James Damore, posted the
essay Google's Ideological Echo Chamber, 8 which made just these points in a
memo that contained this simple but instructive pair of graphs:

66. See Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, Rank-Order Contracts as Optimal Labor Tournaments, 89 J.
POL. ECON. 841 (1981).
67.

For a discussion of this issue on connection with aptitudes and skills in areas as diverse as baseball,

track and chess, see DAVID EPSTEIN, THE SPORTS GENE: INSIDE THE SCIENCE OF EXTRAORDINARY ATHLETIC
PERFORMANCE (2014).
68.

JAMES DAMORE, GOOGLE'S IDEOLOGICAL ECHO CHAMBER: HOW BIAS CLOUDS OUR THINKING ABOUT

DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION (2017), https://drive.google.com/viewemg/viewer?url=https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3914586/Googles-Ideological-Echo-Chamber.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8EW-SPM3].
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Populations have significant overlap

Trait

Reducing people to their group identity and
assuming the average is representative ignores
this overlap (this is bad and I don't endorse that)

Trait

The bottom graph illustrates a stereotype because it makes it appear that
every member of the green group is superior to every member of the blue group.
As noted, that practice will be followed in those cases where there is no information about individual cases, which in the aggregate will yield the more optimal
outcome. The top curve is not a stereotype at all, but an accurate and complete
account of the distribution of the relevant attributes of individual members of the
two groups. As such, its use should be praised, not condemned even by Sundar
Pichai, Google's CEO, who decided to fire Damore for "advancing harmful gender stereotypes in our workplace." According to Pichai, "[t]o suggest a group of
our colleagues have traits that make them less biologically suited to that work is
offensive and not OK." 69 Those last two words are his fashionable way of saying
that Damore's conduct was morally reprehensible.
It is hard to exaggerate the level of intellectual confusion that his simple
remark embodies. Pichai must know statistics, but he does not ask the question
of whether the analysis is true or if the underlying fact pattern is accurate-which
are the only questions that matter to any intellectual inquiry. He could, of course,
argue, as is surely the case, that other emotional or social factors influence performance, but in a highly technical area these are likely to have less of an impact
than they are in business or law where relationship skills are also likely to matter.
But these critical social skills are not likely to bridge any large technical gap. It
is also important to note that the observed differences, even if validated, do not
provide us with any explanation as to their source, which could stem from an
uncertain mixture of biological and social factors, especially those influencing
69. Sundar Pichai, Note to Employees from CEO Sundar Pichai, GOOGLE KEYWORD (Aug. 8, 2017),
[https://perma.cc/9T
https://www.blog.google/outreach-initiatives/diversity/note-employees-ceo-sundar-picha/

SZ-BQGC].
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development at early ages. 70 For these purposes, however, the question is not the
origin of the differences, but instead their predictive effect on performance levels. There is a large body of social science literature that concludes over large
portions of the distribution that observed differences between the sexes are of
little or no importance. 71 The absolute differences are often small, and other factors tend to influence heavily the success or failure of individuals.
The data that are relevant to the Google experience and that of other top
tech companies, however, do not lie at the middle of the distribution, but at its
top tail. A powerful 2016 study performed by the Duke University Talent Identification Program provides useful insight. 72 This study analyzed 320,000 American students in the seventh-grade, each of whom had scored in the top 5% on an
initial standardized test. Once selected, the students were then given an "abovelevel test," either the SAT, ACT or EXPLORE standardized exam. Aggregating
the results from the 2011-2015 administrations of the exams, the study found
that relating to mathematical performance, males were between two to three
times more likely than women to score on the right tail of the distribution, here
defined as 700+ on the SAT Math section and 24+ on the ACT Math section.
This is a notable improvement, as only three decades prior, the ratio was as high
as thirteen-to-one in favor of men. Conversely, however, the same data set revealed that relating to verbal performance, women were approximately 1.5 times
more likely than men to score on the right tail of the distribution, here defined as
700+ on the SAT Verbal section and 32+ on the ACT English section, a finding
that was durable across the previous three decades. The study concludes by noting that "large performance differences at early ages can help create large representation gaps in various domains of study in postsecondary school as well as
occupational choice." 73
Clearly, these data need to be interpreted with caution. There is likely to be
some correlation between the top examinations and performance levels. But it is
also possible that the SATs are too weak a screen to sort out who can do the
highest-level of quantitative work. It is not necessary to resolve all these questions here, but it is appropriate to note that unless and until issues are sorted out,
it would be a mistake to attribute all the observed differences to some explicit or
latent discrimination. It is also important to note that the differences in performance are surely not dependent exclusively on "math" or "verbal" abilities defined as above, but can turn on matters of attitude as well as aptitude, which in
turns leaves open the troublesome question of whether a strong aptitude is one
of the determinants for a favorable attitude. But each of these caveats do not
70. James J. Heckman et al., The Rate ofReturn to the High Scope PerryPreschoolProgram, 94 J. PUB.
ECON. 114, 115-16 (2010) (estimating a social rate of return of 7% to 10% for each dollar invested in the education of a child between 3 and 5 years of age in high quality programs).
71. See, e.g., N.J. Mackintosh, Sex Differences and IQ, 28 J. BiosocIAL SC. 559, 560 (1996); Johannes
Rojahn & Jack A. Naglieri, Developmental GenderDifferences on the Naglieri Nonverbal Ability Test in a NationallyNormed Sample of 5-17 Year Olds, 34 INTELLIGENCE 253, 253 (2006) ("The NNAT [Naglieri Nonverbal
Ability Test] did not reveal meaningful gender differences at any stage between the ages of 6 and 17 years.").
72. Matthew C. Makel at el., Sex Differences in the Right Tail of CognitiveAbilities: An Update and Cross
CulturalExtension, 59 INTELLIGENCE 8 (2016).

73.

Id at 14.
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falsify the results. They only put them in context. So at the very least, these data,
and others like them, tend to undercut any claim that the differential performance
levels at Google and other firms are based solely on discrimination. Indeed, given
the strong commitment to diversity and inclusion in companies like Google, it is
a real stretch to attribute the uneven representation of men and women in the
company to some form of implicit bias, given that their explicit preferences cut
manifestly in the opposite direction. The assertion that all observed differences
in occupational outcomes are merely the result of stereotypes is simply unsupported by the available data.
Moreover, any erroneous diagnosis of differences in outcomes in turn leads
to a dangerous cure, which is the implementation of sex-specific remediation
programs, which predictably have only limited value. This is because at the high
levels of performance demanded, additional inputs of training yield only small
gains to those who are not already in the tiny top group. So Damore was correct
to note that the millions spent on diversity programs to introduce explicit sex
classifications into the Google workplace also results in the systematic denial of
certain opportunities to White and Asian men. It is not possible to artificially
restrict the consequences of using false premises to make institutional judgments,
such that internal relationships on race and gender become ever more strainedat least until dissenters like Damore are silenced, and in his case, forced out of
the firm entirely. It is of course possible to try to address the differences between
sexes in an organization through educational outreach programs, which Google
does on matters just like these by supporting STEM and technology programs

for girls. 74 But Google has no market power in the educational space, and boys
who have these interests will find, perhaps at some higher cost, the needed opportunity to hone their own skills. The net effect, therefore, is that Google's policies do a great disservice to the cause of good human relations, for whenever
false charges of discrimination are made either by or against the firm, it makes it
all the harder to conduct dealings with presumptions of good faith.
ACADEMIC LOYALTY TESTS

The last topic that I wish to address concerns an issue that cuts closest to
my field, which is university education. There has been, without question, a profound and welcome change in the composition of students and faculty since I
first entered Columbia College in the fall of 1960. Patterns of immigration into
the United States, the greater achievement of women in multiple professional
areas, and an increased recognition that success in the marketplace requires
global firms to engage with all segments of the marketplace have in tandem
changed the composition of the workforce, which is now able to draw on a larger,
deeper, and more diverse talent pool than ever before. The normal pressure of
market forces has the same desirable consequences in this setting as in any other
74. Richard A. Epstein, Innovation and Inequality: The Separability Thesis, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL. 1,
18-19 (2016); see also GOOGLE'S WOMEN TECHMAKERS, https://www.womentechmakers.com/ (last visited Aug.
11, 2020).
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labor market. The university that attaches the highest value to any given prospective faculty member will, as a first approximation, create opportunities for academic excellence and advancement, even if other potential institutions disagree
with the assessment of a particular faculty member's qualifications. Wholly apart
from any application of the civil rights law, a vast number of incremental changes
by multiple institutions will alter forever the face of all institutions of higher
learning.
So the question then arises, what can any program of diversity and inclusion
add to this development? If such a program warned all people, regardless of race
and gender, to be aware of their implicit biases, it could serve as a useful cautionary function that could at the margins improve the overall selection process.
But the current situation is decidedly the opposite, given the selective claims of
implicit bias as being applicable to some groups, not all. Diversity and inclusion
are now a bedrock value inside universities that displaces all other considerations, including those of excellence in intellect and teaching. The paean to diversity was evident in Students for FairAdmissions v. President and Fellows of
Harvard College,75 where District Court Judge Allison Burroughs rebuffed a
challenge by Asian students who claimed that they were, relative to their qualifications, underrepresented in the College. The outcome of the case was telegraphed in its opening gambit:
It is somewhat axiomatic at this point that diversity of all sorts, including
racial diversity, is an important aspect of education. See Brown v. Boardof

Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The evidence at trial was clear that a heterogeneous student body promotes a more robust academic environment
with a greater depth and breadth of learning, encourages learning outside
76
the classroom, and creates a richer sense of community.
The legal citation to Brown indicates that the Judge Burroughs thought that
Brown,77 which ended formal segregation, also championed diversity, even
though it does not include so much as a syllable about either diversity or affirmative action, which only comes before the Supreme Court a generation later in
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber.78 Weber in turn offers a comprehensive defense of affirmative action, but contains not a single word about either
diversity or inclusion, either separately or in tandem. It is an ill harbinger for an
opinion to write as if an attack on institutional segregation necessarily clinches
the case for modern versions of diversity and inclusion.
However recent its origins, it is clear that diversity has become the rallying
cry for the modern civil rights movement. Thus, the "them" announced in Students for FairAdmissions (SSFA) resonates with the dominant institutional take
on the same questions:
The diversity of the people of California has been the source of innovative
ideas and creative accomplishments throughout the state's history into the
75.

397 F. Supp. 3d 126 (D. Mass. 2019).

76.

Id. at 133.

77. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
78. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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present. Diversity-a defining feature of California's past, present, and future-refers to the variety of personal experiences, values, and worldviews
that arise from differences of culture and circumstance. Such differences
include race, ethnicity, gender, age, religion, language, abilities/disabilities, sexual orientation, ender identity, socioeconomic status, and geographic region, and more. 9
Exactly how diversity achieves all of these goals is left unstated both in the
SFFA decision and the California pronouncement, but the one form of diversity
that is neither mentioned nor prized is that of diversity of intellectual perspectives
on campus, which is essential to create an environment where all ideas are always
at risk to rigorous counterargument. To make sure that its explicit preferences
for race and gender considerations pass constitutional muster, the California
statement, like SFFA, counts diversity as a "compelling state interest," which
thereby renders it largely immune from attack from those who continue to advocate for a color- and sex-blind position in referring to the protections offered to
"any individual," without regard to their personal characteristics. 80 The California statement then shows how it is possible to have it all: "Diversity should also
be integral to the University's achievement of excellence. Diversity can enhance
the ability of the University to accomplish its academic mission."8 1
These assertions of a compelling state interest have nothing in common
with the traditional test which holds that any effort to overcome an explicit constitutional or statutory guarantee requires that the state show that there is an important ultimate goal that must be implemented by narrowly tailored or least restrictive means. 2 If the basic prohibition is one against government
discrimination, the service of discrimination cannot be the desired end. It has to
be some educational form of excellence, which is better achieved without the
diversity screen than with it, so that the constant iteration of the same theme
should in this context prohibit the finding of a compelling state interest.
It is the mark of the starkly incomplete analysis in both the District Court
opinion and the California statement to see a total endorsement of a given position on any issue when there is no attempt to examine either the objections to or
limitations on the application and extent of the principle. Yet that is exactly what
has happened here. No trade-offs are recognized under either the SFFA or the

University of California regime. It is stated that any effort to advance diversity,
as defined, is posited to advance the academic excellence of the institution. At
this point then, why the fuss, if the traditional principles of selection will lead a
university to the same position of academic excellence? But the short answer is
79. Policies & Guidelines, U. CAL. DrvERsrry, https://diversity.universityofcalifomia.edu/policies-guidelines/ [https://perma.cc/WYS8-6LPT] (last visited Aug. 11, 2020).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2018):
(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or ...
81. Policies & Guidelines, supra note 79.

82.

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pella, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
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that it will not. We know that in dealing with the admissions of students into
universities, the differences are huge by ethnic group. Consider this table:
TABLE 1: COMBINED SAT SCORE, AND CHANGES SINCE 2006,
83
BY RACE/ETHNICITY

Group
American Indian
Asian-American
Black
Mexican-American
Puerto Rican
Other Hispanic
White

Combined Score 2015
1423
1654
1277
1343
1347
1345
1576

Change Since 2006
-27
+54
-14
-28
-16
-26
-6

These numbers state that Black scores are 299 points below White scores
and 377 points below Asian American scores. No matter how this raw data is
sliced, the gaps are enormous and they speak to major differences in the level of
preparation for academic work in any and all areas. There is no question that the
use of these scores plays a strong role in deciding admissions for students within
any given category, so that whether one deals with White, Asian American or
Black applicants, the within-group rankings are critical. Those gaps are typically
much smaller than the inter-group differences that are observed, and yet the tools
that are used in the within-race group classification are largely, if not wholly,
ignored in the across-group rankings. It is of course defensible to say as a matter
of first principle that each private institution is entitled to pick whomever it wants
for whatever reason it wants. But that argument does not survive in a world in
which Title VI imposes an explicit prohibition against discrimination based on
race. 84 But for these purposes, the hard question is how can anyone argue that
there is no compromise in academic quality in the face of vast differences in preuniversity performance? And that difference is, of course, reflected in graduation
85
rates, as the following table from Inside Higher ED indicates:

83. Scott Jaschik, The Numbers and the Arguments on Asian Admissions, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Aug. 7,
https://www.insidehighered.com/admissions/article/2017/08/07/look-data-and-arguments-about-asian2017),
americans-and-admissions-elite [https://perma.cc/Y5GF-AJKQ].
84. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2018). Prohibition against exclusion from participation in, denial of benefits of,
and discrimination under federally assisted programs on ground of race, color, or national origin.
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
85. Emily Tate, GraduationRates and Race, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/04/26/college-completion-rates-vary-race-and-ethnicity-report-finds
[https://perma.cc/CGP2-95Tr].
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noted earlier, in an institutionalized racism that requires strong action to correct-whether or not it advances academic excellence.
It is therefore no surprise that the next stage in this process is to put diversity and inclusion at the center of the hiring process, whereby in the academic
setting it is now required that every applicant must give their own account of

how they will work in their own career to advance the goals of diversity and
inclusion. One consequence of this standard is that any consideration of academic merit is put on the back burner until these concerns are satisfied, which in
practice means a heavy concentration of left-of-center faculty members, which
is wholly skewed in favor of Democratic and liberal professors who are white
and Jewish or nonreligious, and a corresponding reduction in Republican and
conservative professors. 87 The skew is enormous: "A study of various university
faculties showed that at Cornell the ratio of liberal to conservative faculty members was 166 to 6, at Stanford it was 151 to 17, at UCLA it was 141 to 9, and at
the University of Colorado it was 116 to 5."88 Professor Stephen Bainbridge, a
conservative member of the UCLA faculty, quotes all these materials in a blogpost8 9 that makes his application for a merit raise on the grounds that he will add
intellectual diversity to the faculty. Professor Bainbridge shouldn't hold his
breath waiting for his raise. Intellectual diversity is the first casualty from the
requirements of loyalty oaths to diversity. Thus, the operation of hiring for life
sciences at UC Berkeley now starts with a screen that deals solely with diversity
and inclusion issues, and only those that pass this test are considered at the next
stage of the hiring process. The question here is not one of subtle inference, but
of explicit administrative command: "The LSI [Life Science Initiative] Committee conducted a first review and evaluated candidates based solely on contributions to diversity, equity and inclusion. Only candidates that met a high standard
in this area were advanced for further review, narrowing the pool down to 214
9
for serious consideration." 90 The ranking system has very explicit categories. 1
The basic scale moves from 1 to 5 and makes clear that a low 1-2 ranking is
necessarily awarded to people who have had little exposure to diversity, or only
87. James Lindgren, Measuring Diversity: Law Faculties in 1997 and 2013, 39 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
89, 93, 99 (2016).
88. Patrick M. Garry, The Next Step in Diversity: Extending the Logic of Grutter v. Bollinger to Faculty
Tenure, 82 DENY. U. L. REV. 1, 23-24 n.140 (2004).
89. Stephen Bainbridge,I Submit Herewith My "Diversity, Equity, andInclusion" Statementfor my Merit
Raise at UCLA W, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Dec. 23, 2019), https://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2019/ 12/i-submit-herewith-my-diversity-equity-and-inclusion-statement-for-my--merit-raiseat-uclaw.html?mod=article_inline [https://perma.cc/U3QD-NJTM].
90. REBECCA HEALD & MARY WILDERMUTH, INITIATIVE TO ADVANCE FACULTY DIVERSITY, EQUITY AND
INCLUSION IN THE LIFE SCIENCE AT UC BERKELEY, YEAR END SUMMARY REPORT: 2018-2019, U. CAL.
BERKELEY OFF. FOR FAC. EQUITY & wELFARE, https://ofew.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/life_sciences_initi-

tatve.yearendreportsummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/YXZ5-8DRT].
91.

RUBRIC TO ASSESS CANDIDATE CONTRIBUTIONS TO DIVERSITY, EQUITY, AND INCLUSION, U. CAL.

BERKELEY, https://ofew.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/rubricto_assesscandidate_contributions_todiversity_
equity_and_inclusion.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8XV-KLZX]. For criticism of the position, see Jerry Coyne, Life
Science Jobs at Berkeley Give Precedence to Candidates'Diversity and Inclusion Statements, WHY EVOLUTION
2 3
IS TRUE (Dec. 31, 2019), https://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2019/1 / 1/life-science-jobs-at-berkeleywith-hiring-giving-precedence-to-diversity-and-inclusion-statements/ [https://perma.cc/W8Q7-FBCF].
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endorse its goals in general terms, without any detailed knowledge of the social
problem and the wealth of information that is used to deal with it. At the opposite
pole is a deep commitment to the entire process. Thus the LSI Committee demands: "Clear knowledge of, experience with, and interest in dimensions of diversity that result from different identities, such as ethnic, socioeconomic, racial,
gender, sexual orientation, disability, and cultural differences." 92 That, in tum,
leads to a commitment to acquire information about the problem and to talk about
it. The section then ends with a political loyalty test, requiring that applicants
discuss "diversity, equity, and inclusion as core values that every faculty member
should actively contribute to advancing." 93 And so it was that Berkeley rejected
679 out of 893 applicants, or 76%, solely on diversity grounds. 94 But not only at
Berkeley, the implementation of this program has had profound effects on the
selection processes at UC Davis as well. Thus it has been reported by Brian Leiter
that in "2018-2019 UC Davis ran eight open discipline searches using this methodology. 95 With all the other searches conducted at UC Davis in 2018-2019 under 10% of the applicant pool were minorities, just about 5% of the finalists and
2.3% of hires. But in the pilot searches nearly a third of the applicants were minorities, over 80% of the finals, and a full 100% of those hired were minorities.
The results for female hires was similarly sharp, with 87.5% of those hired
through the pilot program being women, compared with 45.5% campus wide." 96
The message is stunningly clear. Either you are with the program or you are out
of contention for appointments.
These statements are absolute pre-commitments for moving on in the hiring
process, and any skepticism is a fatal disqualification, which means that with
each successive appointment, the ideological iteration of the faculty becomes
more politically homogenous, thus making it impossible for any skeptic of the
system to survive. There is not the slightest willingness to debate these issues,
which now have the status of self-anointed truth. Any problems that arise because
weaker faculty members are hired, and weaker students are admitted, are glossed
over as irrelevant considerations. Diversity and inclusion have become code
words for excluding both by race and sex, followed by the complete silencing of
any intellectual disagreement. It is a regrettable form of totalitarian behavior,
which at no point needs to engage its critics in any form of debate. Make no
mistake about it, we have a distinguished state institution eagerly engaging in a
vigorous and systematic program that supports explicit viewpoint discrimination,
92. U. CAL. BERKELEY, supra note 91, at 1.
93. Id.
94. Coyne, supra note 91.
95. Advancing Faculty Diversity Grant, 2018-2019, U. CAL. DAVIS ACAD. AFF., https://academicaffairs.ucdavis.edu/advancing-faculty-diversity-pilot-project [https://perma.cc/G238-E96L] (last updated Dec. 10,
2019) ("Participating schools or colleges include: The College of Agriculture and Environmental Sciences, The
College of Biological Sciences, The College of Engineering, The Graduate School of Management, The School
of Education, The School of Law, The School of Medicine, The School of Veterinary Medicine.").
96. Brian Leiter, Were you Rejected in One of the University of California Job Searches Utilizing the
Unlawful "Diversity Statements"?, LErrER REP. (Jan. 28, 2020, 5:22 PM), https://leiterreports.typepad.com/
blog/2020/01/were-you-rejected-in-one-of-the-university-of-california-job-searches-utilizing-the-unlawful-diversi.html [https://perma.cc/ZF4Y-U78H].
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which is then paired with race and gender discrimination, in the selection of its
faculty members.
The precedents for these actions are ominous. During the 1950s and 1960s,
one of the most contentious issues was the requirement that individuals sign loyalty oaths of the sort that affirmatively stated they are not and never were members of the Communist Party, which resulted in some cases of genuine tragedy,
as in the case of George Anastaplo, who was denied admission to the bar when
he refused, on principle, to sign a declaration that he was not a member of the
Communist Party. 97 In an 8-1 decision, over an impassioned dissent from Justice
Hugo Black, the much respected Justice John Marshall Harlan concluded that "in
enforcing such a rule as applied to refusals to answer questions about membership in the Communist Party outweighs any deterrent effect upon freedom of
speech and association, and hence that such state action does not offend the Fourteenth Amendment." 98 At the very least it could be argued that some compelling
state interest arose from the concern with national security. But those claims
seem far-fetched in the extreme, which is why most civil libertarians of that earlier era, including David Baum, would have surely held that given the "uncon99
troverted evidence as to Anastaplo's 'good moral character"' the burden should
fall on the state to prove some reason to fear the Communist affiliation in light
of his general record of excellence. The case made Anastaplo a genuine casualty
of the excesses of the anti-Communist sentiments of the time.
The hard question here is what possible state interest in diversity could rise
to the level of the asserted claims of national security in the anti-Communist
loyalty oath cases. Calling diversity a compelling state interest should be a clear
loser, given the disappointing performance of diversity programs in generating
the academic excellence that they purport to advance, and the ability to get a
wide diversity of substantive views, articulated with greater passion and power
from a stronger academic cohort. The entire program fails the compelling state
interest test.

It is therefore a matter of genuine personal sadness that Professor Abigail
Thompson, a Vice President of the American Mathematics Society, took strong
exception to the ever larmer role that so-called diversity statements have in driving the hiring process. 10 Thus, on a scale of five, she notes that any candidate
who states that he or she will treat all students the same "regardless of background" will get a low score (1 or 2 on a scale of 5), which only makes the political dimension of the process even greater. Needless to say, UC Davis offered

97.

In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961).

98.
99.

Id. at 89.
Id. at 85.
See Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 227.
Abigail Thompson, A Word From, 66 NOTICES AM. MATHEMATICAL Soc'Y 1778, 1779 (2019),

100.
101.

https://www.ams.org/journals/notices/201911/rnoti-pl778.pdf [https://perma.cc/X29Z-JYEP]. Her column was
a longer version of the op-ed that she wrote in the Wall Street Journal. Abigail Thompson, The University'sNew
Loyalty Oath, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2019, 6:55 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-universitys-new-loyaltyoath-i 1576799749 [https://perma.cc/R7Gv-6NHK].
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its standard diversity justification for this litmus test. 102 The ostensible justification for this policy is that increasing the supply of African American Ph.Ds. in
mathematics (less than 1% in all programs) is an important goal. But as Professor
Thompson makes clear, she-and I dare say every member of her departmentwould do all that they could to help any student achieve their goals. A simple
reminder by a department chair could handle this issue. Clearly, this front-end
policy is a massive overkill that affects every aspect of graduate education, and
is moreover all too emblematic of the current Civil Rights Juggernaut that allows
no dissent from the orthodoxy propounded by the Harvards and the UCs of the
world.
CONCLUSION

A brief summary of the argument is now in order. As a general matter of
political theory, the use of state coercion should be regarded as presumptively
bad until it is shown to be necessary. To a classical liberal like myself, that general maxim translates into a general position that government force should be
confined to deal with problems of force, fraud and monopoly. Under those standards, aggressive government intervention to advance civil rights was fully justified in the earlier age of segregation when powerful forces suppressed large portions of the American population on the grounds of race. But with those battles
won, their lessons have been forgotten by the current generation of civil rights
advocates who have forgotten that their key role was to combat excessive state
power. Now that these former outsiders have gained in both political and rhetorical dominance, controlling both the academic sphere and government halls, they
have imitated some of the worst practices of their predecessors by finding all
sorts of "compelling interests" that pay little or no attention to the position of the
"discrete and insular minorities" of today.
Just look at the record. The discourse all too often starts with a contemptuous dismissal of capitalism that shows scant appreciation of the virtues of a decentralized market authority. The targets of the new civil rights movement include the bakers, photographers, florists, and designers who have religious
objections to same-sex marriage. But I am not aware of a single state court that
has upheld their claims. 13 It covers institutions like Gibson's Bakery that are
denounced as racist merely because it seeks to prevent the theft of its merchandise. It includes, not Google, but individual Google employees who are run out
of the firm because they seek to explain the role of statistical analysis in handling
complex data sets. It includes the wide range of conservative and straight, white
males whose status requires some degree of subordination based on stereotypes
that bear no relationship to the group under analysis. None of this is pretty, but
all of it must be said. There is always a tendency for dominant groups to use the
102. News and Media Relations, Response to Faculty DEI Statements, U. CAL. DAVIS (Nov. 22, 2019),
https://www.ucdavis.edu/news/response-questions-about-faculty-dei-statements/
[https://perma.cc/3vBN6KCA].
103.

See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013); Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor

& Indus., 434 P.3d 25 (Or. 2018); Washington v. Arlene's Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017).
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law to strengthen their position against their already weakened adversaries. That
was all too true under Jim Crow. It is frightening to observe how the new dominant classes of today are using their power to regulate-decimating the status
and dignity of any group or person who stands in their path. Perhaps Michelle
Alexander was right after all. It is with great sadness we recognize that with the
New Civil Rights Juggernaut, indeed, the more things change, the more they stay
the same.

